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Abstract
This study examines elderly people’s innate moral foundations in influencing decisions, 
and their subsequent enjoyment in an interactive media environment. The Moral 
Foundation Questionnaire was used to distinguish between the moral intuitions of 
elderly US and German respondents, who were believed to have divergent yet stable 
moral codes that would be salient in a novel virtual world. In an experimental design, 
participants (N=116) were confronted with a computer simulation in which they could 
decide to violate or uphold each of five moral intuitions. Germans and Americans 
differed in their moral foundations, yet for both groups higher moral salience led 
to a decrease in decisions to commit moral violations in a virtual world. Results for 
enjoyment were mixed.
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While computer and internet use among elderly media users has increased over the last 
decade, these users can still be understood using Prensky’s (2001) notion of digital immi-
grants. By this, Prensky is referring to individuals who may use digital media now, but 
did not grow up using it; this is in contrast to digital natives, or individuals who have 
incorporated digital media into their lives from a very young age. Moreover, while 
digital immigrants may have learned to adapt to the new digital environment, they 
‘always retain, to some degree, their [real-world] “accent”’ (Prensky, 2001: 2). In 
particular, their usage of and experience with virtual worlds is limited.
Based on Prensky’s concept of digital immigration and evidence from relevant 
migration literature (Feather, 1979; Vauclair, 2009), we assume that elderly media 
users make decisions in virtual worlds based on their real-life beliefs. Approaches in 
entertainment theory suggest that moral considerations play a crucial role for media 
enjoyment (Zillmann, 2000; Zillmann and Cantor, 1976), and studies using interactive 
media provide us with a perspective on the relationship between morality and enjoy-
ment. On the one hand, players of violent video games have been found to morally 
disengage from content when confronted with moral violations such as killing virtual 
characters (Klimmt et al., 2006). On the other hand, people’s highly empathic enjoy-
ment of video games is reduced when players are forced to act against their moral code 
(Hartmann and Vorderer, 2010). For elderly media users not familiar with virtual 
worlds, we would expect that moral disengagement strategies are not as established, 
and as a result that they would rely more on real-life value systems. Thus we expect 
that when confronted with moral dilemmas in virtual worlds, digital immigrants will 
both (a) base their decisions on moral orientations from real life and (b) enjoy the 
experience more when characters in the virtual environment behave according to the 
individual’s intuitive real life moral orientation. These predictions are based on Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt and Joseph, 2007), an intuitionist’s perspective on 
morality that has been applied to understanding the relationship between morality and 
media consumption and enjoyment (Tamborini, 2011). The hypotheses are tested in an 
experimental setting, where the participants – elderly computer users (nGermany=54, 
nUSA=62) – were confronted with morally challenging scenarios in an interactive and 
entertaining virtual environment developed by the research team.
Digital immigration
At first, Prensky’s concept of the digital immigrant might seem to be a felicitous meta-
phor. Yet integrating concepts from migration studies to the appropriation of technology 
may help us to understand how elderly people react to morally challenging content in 
interactive media. Recent approaches in migration studies accentuate the notion that 
migration is not a one-way process of assimilation, but rather a complex process con-
sisting of different acculturation strategies (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007; Nauck, 2008). 
This is paralleled in findings from research and theory on the appropriation of media 
and technology literature (such as social shaping/construction of technology, domesti-
cation theory and the social construction of technology), which stresses a similar social 
negotiation process (Quandt and von Pape, 2010). We argue that when elderly people 
are confronted with morally challenging situations in a virtual world, they might indeed 
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experience a similar situation that migration literature describes when migrants are 
confronted with a new and unfamiliar culture (Feather, 1979) – a situation causing 
feelings of disorientation and a reliance on the values and norms known to them from 
their host culture (Esser, 1980: 71). This is particularly relevant for elderly people with 
established sets of norms and values (Feather, 1979).
When people migrate into any environment, they face the challenge of having to 
cope with cultural differences. As shared values are a core aspect of culture, migrants 
are confronted with adjusting their value system to that of the culture they are migrating 
to (Vauclair, 2009). There is at least minimal consensus that culture can be seen as a 
collective phenomenon shared by its members (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 2006), or a 
‘collective programming of the mind’ (Hofstede, 2001: 9). Such reasoning implies that 
elderly people, unfamiliar with novel virtual worlds, have conceptually similar experi-
ences to migrants entering a new country.
Moral development and the elderly
The majority of research on moral development focuses on children, particularly ado-
lescents and young adults, as moral systems are developed during adolescence (Malti 
et al., 2007). However, age-related differences have been reported in research on moral-
ity, for instance between teenagers and the elderly (50–65 and 65+) with respect to 
moral reasoning (McDonald and Stuart-Hamilton, 1996). Using Shweder et al.’s (1997) 
considerations of the three ethics of autonomy, community and divinity, Haidt et al. 
(1993) demonstrated that young Americans relied on the ethics of autonomy far more 
than those of community and divinity. These results were collaborated by Jensen (1995), 
who found that young adults (19−27 years) focused primarily on autonomy, while 
midlife (35–56 years) and older adults (65–84 years) focused on each of the three 
ethical bases in roughly equal proportions. These findings suggest that age-related 
differences in moral orientations can be found across the lifespan.
While moral orientations differ across younger and older age groups, differences 
within older age groups are marginal. Jensen (1997) expanded his analysis of the 
three age groups (young, midlife, older adults) to investigate how far the ‘culture war’ 
between American progressive liberals and orthodox conservatives shaped by differ-
ent moral perspectives (Hunter, 1991) remains stable across the lifespan. Jensen 
hypothesized that with age comes a decreased reliance on autonomy and an increased 
reliance on community for both cultures; no change in the reliance on divinity was 
predicted. The results found that indeed progressives reasoned more in terms of 
autonomy when confronted with moral issues, while orthodox participants reasoned 
more in terms of divinity. Importantly, these differences were found across all age 
groups employed in the study. In other words, adherence to a culture of orthodoxy or 
progressivism was a better predictor of changes in moral focus than age was, as the 
distinction between orthodox and progressivist moral evaluations occurred across the 
adult lifespan.
These findings illustrate that moral orientations remain fairly stable across the adult 
lifespan and are consolidated through lifelong experiences. In particular, elderly citizens 
are people with strong and stable moral orientations across Shweder et al.’s (1997) 
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concept of the three ethics. Recently, the three ethics have been developed into a broader, 
intuitionist model of morality – Moral Foundations Theory or MFT.
Moral foundations theory
MFT is a social psychological approach to morality. Based on well-discussed shortcom-
ings of existing concepts of individual morality – namely the predominance of rational-
istic approaches to morality (Kohlberg, 1969) and the conceptually restrictive nature of 
past theorizing to explain moral judgments (e.g. a result of fairness and harm: Turiel, 
1983) – Haidt (2001) developed MFT based on a broader intuitionist approach to moral 
judgments (Graham et al., 2009), which incorporates several dimensions of moral foun-
dation as well as explaining the fact that often moral dumbfounding occurs that cannot 
be accounted for in rationalist concepts of morality. First, MFT presents five universal 
domains, or modules, based on anthropological and developmental psychology research 
that these moral intuitions fall into: harm/care, which is concerned with the suffering of 
others and empathy; fairness/reciprocity, which is related to reciprocity and justice; in-
group/loyalty, which deals with the common good and punishment of outsiders; author-
ity/respect, which concerns the negotiation of rank in the social hierarchies; and purity/
sanctity, which is concerned with a pure, clean way of life (cf. Haidt and Graham, 2007; 
Haidt and Joseph, 2007 for a detailed discussion of the roots of each foundation). These 
five modules are innate and are thought to represent a first draft of morality in our brains 
before we are sensitized by experiences during our socialization. Second, MFT specifies 
the notion of moral dumbfounding as a more logical explanation for the types of morally 
based reactions that individuals often have. Moral dumbfounding occurs when people 
have an immediate intuitive good or bad reaction to a behavior that cannot be justified 
rationally. Moral intuitions are described as ‘the sudden conscious appearance of a moral 
judgment, including an affective valence (good−bad, like−dislike) without any conscious 
awareness of having gone through steps of weighing evidence’ (Haidt, 2001: 818). 
Highlighting these aspects of moral judgments, Haidt and his colleagues derive their 
moral theory as a dual-process one that accounts for the immediate intuitive reaction as 
well as a subsequent cognitive, rational processing. Haidt formulates the relationship 
between intuitive and cognitive−rational (moral reasoning) as ‘intuitive primacy but not 
dictatorship’ (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010: 801). Importantly for the present study, MFT 
argues that the presence of moral modules is universal across cultures, while the salience 
of each varies between cultures: that is, module salience is ‘edited by (cultural) experi-
ence’ (Haidt and Joseph, 2007: 377).
A cross-cultural perspective on morality
Applications of MFT tend to focus on political contexts in the US as a ‘war of culture’ 
(Hunter, 1991) by identifying differences in moral orientations between political sub-
groups (cf. Graham et al., 2009). However, while MFT is designed to address a variety 
of cultural differences in moral orientations, no known work has tested MFT-based moral 
differences at the national level. While not a primary focus of the study, examining cul-
tures with different moral orientations allows for a more complete test of the role of 
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morality in observed interactions in virtual environments; using elderly populations from 
two cultures allows for the examination of two distinct cultures with similar inexperience 
with technology.
Broadly, national moral orientation can be split up in terms of individualistic vs. col-
lectivistic cultures (Shweder, 1993), which MFT would explain as a function of diver-
gent moral salience patterns. For example, while protecting the independence of the 
individual as well as equality and justice are dominant values in individualistic cultures; 
collectivist cultures have a more interdependent duty-based morality (Wainryb, 2006). In 
this regard, both the US and Germany are considered Western and therefore rather indi-
vidualistic cultures. Yet the two cultures still exhibit differences on more specific dimen-
sions. Hofstede (2001) analyzed discrete value systems in 50 countries, and found the US 
and Germany to differ substantially on dimensions such as individualism (US: rank 1, 
Germany: rank 11) or uncertainty avoidance (Germany: 29, US: 44). Religiosity is 
another morally based dimension (Graham and Haidt, 2010) where Germans and 
Americans differ substantially, with 47 percent of Americans marking religion as ‘very 
important’ compared to 11 percent of Germans (Voigt, 2007; World Value Survey, 2005).
MFT and entertainment theory
The usefulness of MFT in understanding the connection between media and morality has 
been recognized particularly in understanding entertainment media. Tamborini et al. 
(2009) found moral module salience to predict perceived character morality and result-
ing narrative appeal. Eden and Tamborini (2010) underscored the role of morality sub-
cultures (groups of individuals with shared moral salience patterns, similar to our cultural 
distinctions between Americans and Germans) in the formation of character dispositions 
central to the enjoyment process, Zillmann and Cantor (1976), suggesting that moral 
modules are capable of explaining how, when and why people would respond to the same 
content with different judgments. While these processes have been found to impact 
enjoyment, they have also been found to cyclically affect moral salience after repeated 
exposure, similar to the cultural reinforcement of moral intuitions at the national level. 
Tamborini (2011) synthesized these findings into a larger model of intuitive morality and 
exemplification (MIME) that specifies the role of moral module salience in both the 
short-term enjoyment reactions to entertainment media and the long-term effect on moral 
salience stemming from repeated exposure.
Hypotheses and research questions
The research model used in this study combines findings from cross-cultural research on 
morality with results from entertainment and morality research. We apply these findings 
to interactive media to investigate the possibility that the moral module saliencies of 
elderly people predict responses to a series of morally charged situations in a novel vir-
tual environment.
Research on entertainment and morality suggests that different morality subcultures 
respond differently to entertainment media. Up to now, these moral subcultures were 
derived from populations within one nationality. Our study explains this by using MFT 
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to analyze variance in morality at the national level. Thus we expect that national culture 
at least partially explains different saliencies in moral modules, and analyzing elderly 
people from two different cultural backgrounds provides us with the opportunity to ana-
lyze separate moral orientations.
The focus of our study is the role of moral orientation in understanding behaviors in 
and reactions to a novel virtual environment. Based on findings from research on migra-
tion, we assume that for digital immigrants real-life moral orientations act as guidelines 
in virtual worlds as well. A crucial distinction between interactive and non-interactive 
media is the level of agency the user has over on-screen action. Whereas in non-interac-
tive media users can only witness action, interactive media place users in control of the 
action. Moreover, as salient moral modules act as guidelines for actions, particularly for 
digital immigrants, it can be expected that if a moral module’s salience is high, it is more 
likely that a media user will uphold this moral module and will not choose to violate it. 
Furthermore, we expect this general process to be stable across cultures. Although we 
expect to find differences in moral module salience between both cultures at the aggre-
gate level, the prediction should be the same for both cultures: if a moral module is sali-
ent, the probability of a violation being committed should be reduced.
H1: If a moral module is salient, elderly people are more likely to choose not to vio-
late it when confronted with a potential violation in a virtual, interactive 
environment.
In addition, as previous research on media and morality has explicated the role of moral 
salience on enjoyment (Eden et al., 2010), we also focus on this relationship. We assume 
that elderly people with a stable set of moral orientations will not want to be confronted 
with open violations of their salient moral modules. Previous research has already indi-
cated that enjoyment should suffer if people are forced to act against their moral orienta-
tion (Hartmann and Vorderer, 2010). For elderly users, not familiar with virtual worlds, 
we expect this process to be stronger than potential moral management strategies 
(Klimmt et al., 2006). Thus we expect enjoyment of the mediated experience to suffer 
when salient moral modules are violated.
H2: If elderly people are confronted with a potential violation in a salient moral 
module that they would like to prevent, enjoyment will suffer when the violation 
still occurs.
Method
Participants were recruited through adult education centers in both Germany and the US, 
with n=54 German participants (Mage=66.54, SD=6.97, 57 percent female) and n=62 US 
participants (Mage=68.02, SD=11.69, 71 percent female). As part of the cover story for 
the study, participants were informed that they would be evaluating a computer simula-
tion still in development. The experiment took place in computer labs. Groups of partici-
pants were randomly distributed to two treatment conditions (intervention vs. no 
intervention), and asked to play the simulation and to interact with virtual, non-player 
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characters (NPC) (for all NPC episodes, see Bowman et al., 2011, supplemental file). 
Each session started with the participants choosing a male or female avatar and the 
researchers carrying out a tutorial with the participants to explain the simulation’s con-
trols and the administration of study questionnaires. Research assistants were present to 
help participants with the simulation and the questionnaires, as well as to ensure that all 
study materials were administered properly. Following a short tutorial session, partici-
pants played the simulation at their own pace (an average of 30 minutes); during game-
play participants responded to their impressions of the different game interactions. After 
the simulation ended, participants were given a questionnaire with items measuring the 
overall gaming experience, moral foundations and socio-demographics.
Six short written scenarios adapted from existing MFT literature in entertainment 
(Haidt and Joseph, 2007) were pilot-tested in two independent samples of German 
(n=328) and US (n=149) undergraduate students. Each scenario was around 550 charac-
ters long and contained one main male character violating one of the five moral modules. 
A sixth story with no violation of any moral module was used as a control condition. 
Based on the pre-test, all stories violated the intended moral module while not affecting 
the other modules (for a detailed description of the materials and pre-test study please 
refer to Bowman et al., 2011, supplemental file). These scenarios were then transferred 
into a virtual world environment, using the AURORA® toolset of the computer game 
Neverwinter Nights. The toolset allowed us to generating a medieval-style virtual envi-
ronment comparable to popular role-playing games such as World of Warcraft and 
Runescape. All game characters – both player avatars (one male and one female charac-
ter with generic names, e.g. John Doe or Max Mustermann) and NPCs – were generic 
human characters from the game’s character library.
In the virtual environment, participants were told to visit six former students of a profes-
sor in order to gather up photo albums for a party in the professor’s honor. The six students 
represented the NPC episodes referenced above, one for each moral scenario and a control 
scenario. For each NPC, a dialogue was developed using the six pre-tested stories as a foun-
dation. NPCs were presented in-game with an environment and appearance that would fit 
their stories. For example, as the story of one NPC took place in a bar (harm/care), the NPC 
was positioned with the relevant interior (e.g. tables, stools). At the end of each dialogue, 
participants could instruct the NPC either to violate a moral module by telling the character 
to behave as described in the pre-tested scenarios or they could choose to tell the NPC not to 
violate the relevant moral module. In the intervention condition (IC), the NPC declared that 
he would act as indicated by the player. In the no-intervention condition (NIC), the NPC 
always declared that he would commit a violation regardless of the player’s suggestion. 
Participants were unaware of which condition they were confronted with. Participants’ con-
versations and instructions to the NPC were logged using the game’s automatic inventory 
function; participants were not made aware of the inventory system during gameplay.
Measures
Moral evaluation survey
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ: Graham et al., 2009) was used to evaluate 
moral module salience. The original English-language version of the MFQ consists of 32 
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items, including six items measuring module salience and two foil items. Small adjust-
ments had to be made for the German-language application to account for language spe-
cifics, and one item for the purity/sanctity module related to chastity had to be removed 
because of inapplicable wording in German. Internal consistency of the subscales using 
Cronbach’s alpha (α) was: Germany harm/care (α=.564, n=50, six items); fairness/
reciprocity (α=.696, n=50, six items), in-group/loyalty (α=.590, n=52, six items); 
authority/respect (α=.720, n=46, six items); purity/sanctity (α=.647, n=50, five items). US 
harm/care (α=.545, n=61, six items); fairness/reciprocity (α=.638, n=61, six items), in-
group/loyalty (α=.722, n=62, six items); authority/respect (α=.594, n=61, six items); 
purity/sanctity (α=.817, n=61, six items). Notably, some scale dimensions had alpha 
scores slightly lower than the often proposed cutoff scores of .6 (cf. Schmitt, 1996). Yet 
when analyzing internal consistency measures, we must attend to three crucial aspects, 
including sample size, the broadness of the construct and the number of scale items. 
Rammstedt (2010) cautions against rejecting scales as invalid merely on the grounds that 
their internal consistency scores are low, and instead argues that researchers must consider 
how scale items measure the construct prima facie, as well as the costs associated with 
sacrificing theoretically relevant items in favor of increasing internal validity statistically. 
Similarly, Schmitt (1996: 353) argues that ‘when a measure has other desirable properties, 
such as meaningful content coverage of some domain and reasonable unidimensionality, 
this low reliability may not be a major impediment to its use’. We further note past research 
applying MFQ to understanding moral domain saliences (cf. Eden et al., 2010; Graham et 
al., 2009; Tamborini et al., 2009) that has successfully implemented the MFQ with com-
parable reported alpha levels while justifying the lower scores as indicative of the broad 
nature of morality. Thus, while we acknowledge that more work is needed to refine the 
measurement of moral intuitions, we chose to retain the original scale and its items in 
order to better compare our findings with extant literature.
Moral decision
Participants’ responses to NPCs were logged using the game’s discrete inventory func-
tion, resulting in a dichotomous measure for violating (= 1) or not violating (= 0) each.
Enjoyment
An abbreviated version of a video game enjoyment scale used by Klimmt (2005) was 
used to measure enjoyment. Using a preexisting dataset of 64 undergraduate students, 
unidimensionality of the scale was tested and marker items were identified, resulting in 
a seven-item scale. Reliability of the scale was good (Germany: α=.910, n=49; US: 
α=.912, n=61).
Control measures
Experiences in interactive media can be affected by a considerable range of variables 
(Klimmt, 2005). In order not to fall into the trap whereby increasing the number of con-
trol variables means that we find effects only because we increased the number 
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of variables in our model, we limited our focus to certain crucial variables. Thus we 
controlled for age, gender, gaming experiences with computer games (one-item meas-
ure) and feelings of presence (a generalized one-item measure from the German IPQ 
Presence Scale; Schubert et al., 2001). For elderly computer users, technophobia – nega-
tive psychological reaction toward technology – is particularly salient (Rosen and 
Maguire, 1990). Technophobia was controlled for using a scale available in German and 
English (Sinkovics et al., 2002) measuring three dimensions: personal failure (six items: 
Germany: α=.870, n=52/US: α=.851, n=60), human−machine ambiguity (four items: 
Germany: α=.784, n=54/US: α=.811, n=61), and convenience (three items: Germany: 
α=.734, n=54/US: α=.858, n=61).
Results
Randomization check
Participants were randomly assigned to treatment conditions (intervention vs. no inter-
vention). As this manipulation was designed to test variance in enjoyment, we tested to 
ensure that the manipulation did not have an effect on moral module salience or on the 
decision to violate or not a moral module. As – in contrast to significance testing for dif-
ferences – tests for equivalence are complex, we followed the logic of significance test-
ing for differences but we raised the critical test level, arguing that if we found no 
significant differences on this more liberal p-level, we could interpret our groups as not 
different in the relevant criteria. For an acceptable solution, we required the majority of 
differences not to be significant on the p < .25 critical test level with no difference being 
significant at the p=.10 level. For both measures, no differences at the p=.10 level were 
found. For the more conservative p < .25 level (that is, a 75 percent chance of a signifi-
cant difference between measures), differences between the two conditions for US par-
ticipants’ moral salience for fairness/reciprocity (p=.122) and purity/sanctity (p=.174) 
were found; no mean difference was bigger than .4 scale points. For the decision to vio-
late a moral module, only differences for harm/care and in-group/loyalty were significant 
on the raised p < .25 level for Germans (in-group/loyalty: χ2=1.817, p=.178; harm/care: 
χ2=1.651, p=.199). The randomization of participants to conditions was successful.
Cultural differences in moral module salience
The pattern of moral module salience differed significantly between US and German 
participants. Comparing the means of moral module salience yields significant differ-
ences between Germans and Americans for harm/care, fairness/reciprocity and author-
ity/respect. Specifically, Germans showed higher salience for harm/care and fairness/
reciprocity and lower scores for authority/respect (Table 1). These results suggest the 
MFT instrument to be a valid measure of cultural differences at the national level. In our 
study, elderly Germans focused more on harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, and elderly 
Americans reported a more even distribution of moral module salience across all five 
dimensions; these patterns are similar to anecdotal evidence of German culture being 
more liberal than American culture (cf. Graham et al., 2009).
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Hypothesis 1: Morality and decisions in interactive media
H1 predicted that fewer violations would occur in salient moral modules. At the general 
level, the fewest number of violations occurred in the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity 
scenarios – both modules that had the highest average salience scores. This pattern was 
found for both nationalities (Table 2).
Looking at scenario-specific violation patterns between nationalities, there are strik-
ing differences between them. On average, Germans violated significantly more moral 
scenarios than Americans (with MGerman=2.4, SD=1.1, MUS=1.3, SD=1.0, t=5.586, 
df=114, p < .001). This finding seems empirically plausible, as Germans showed on 
average lower salience scores in three out of the five moral modules. Still, they also vio-
lated more often the two scenarios which Germans reported as more salient than their 
American counterparts. On average, the difference between the highest (harm/care) and 
the lowest (purity/sanctity) moral module salience was less than one scale point for the 
Americans; this difference was close to 1.5 scale points for Germans. For Germans, the 
difference between the moral scenario that was least violated (fairness/reciprocity) and 
that was most violated (authority/respect) was 63 percentage points. For the US, the 
same difference (fairness/reciprocity to in-group/loyalty) was only 48 percentage points. 
Why these differences between the two groups occurred remains open for further discus-
sion, but their existence suggests that Germans tended to make more no-go-type deci-
sions regarding moral violations.
In order to test H1, we have to account for these different moral salience patterns. 
That being said, we are primarily interested in the general mechanism that if a moral 
module is salient, elderly people are more likely to choose not to violate it when con-
fronted with a potential violation in a virtual, interactive environment. Therefore, we 






Harm 5.2 (.6) (n=50) 4.9 (.7) (n=60) 2.509 108 .014
Fairness 5.0 (.6) (n=50) 4.7 (.6) (n=61) 2.141 109 .035
Authority 3.7 (.9) (n=46) 4.5 (.8) (n=61) −4.663 105 <.001
In-group 4.1 (.8) (n=52) 4.3 (.9) (n=62) −1.690 112 .094
Purity 3.8 (1.0) (n=50) 4.0 (1.2) (n=61) −1.146 109 .146
Table 2. Observed moral violations
Violations (Total) Violations (Germany) Violations (US)
Harm 17% (n=114) 25% (n=52) 10% (n=62)
Fairness  7% (n=115)  9% (n=53)  5% (n=62)
Authority 52% (n=116) 72% (n=54) 34% (n=62)
In-group 55% (n=116) 67% (n=54) 45% (n=62)
Purity 47% (n=116) 65% (n=54) 32% (n=62)
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focused on the general moral salience level and not on the level of individual moral 
modules. A salient module was defined as the module for which a participant had the 
highest salience score, and a non-salient module was a module for which a participant 
had the lowest score. While this approach does not allow us to examine specific modules, 
it is still important from a theoretical perspective, as MFT proposes that moral judgments 
in one module are dependent on moral salience in other modules (Haidt and Joseph, 
2007). For H1 to be confirmed on this general level, two requirements must be met. First, 
the proportion of violations is significantly different between scenarios in modules that 
have the highest salience and that have the lowest salience for participants. Second, the 
proportion of violations for scenarios in modules that have the highest salience for the 
participants is lower than 50 percent and is significantly different from a random distri-
bution: that is, if an individual is able to choose between two options, we expect to find 
a 50−50 (i.e., random) distribution in choices to violate or not, so long as there is no 
systematic mechanism leading to a divergence from this randomness. Additionally, it is 
assumed that this general pattern would be found across national cultures.
In modules with the highest salience, 16 percent of participants opted to violate the 
corresponding module in the simulation. This compares to 56 percent of participants 
violating the corresponding scenario in modules with the lowest salience. The difference 
between the proportions of violations is highly significant between the two groups 
(t=−6.69, df=98, p < .001), supporting our expected pattern. Thus, our first criterion for 
H1 was supported. The number of violations for the most salient module was also signifi-
cantly different from a random distribution (binominal test against 50 percent, p < .001). 
The second criterion for testing H1 at the aggregate moral module level was supported 
as well.
Even though the number of violations was on average overall higher for Germans, the 
general pattern in support of H1 was found for both Germans and Americans. For 
Germans, the number of violations for both modules that are of highest and that are of 
lowest salience increased to 23 percent (highest salience) and 75 percent (lowest sali-
ence) but the difference remains significant (t=−5.875, df=43, p < .001) (criterion 1). 
Additionally, the number of violations for the highest salient modules was significantly 
different from a random distribution (p < .001) (criterion 2). For the American partici-
pants, 10 percent of violations occurred in modules whose salience was highest. For 
modules whose salience was lowest, violations were observed 40 percent of the time. 
Again, this difference is significant (t=−3.807, df=54, p < .001), and the number of viola-
tions for modules of highest salience was significantly different (p < .001) from a random 
distribution.
Even if Germans and Americans differed in the salience of moral modules and the 
number of violations for each of the moral scenarios, the overall pattern as proposed in 
H1 could be supported for both cases. If a moral module was salient, participants were 
more likely not to violate this module than if the module was not salient for them.
Hypothesis 2: Effects on enjoyment
H2 predicted that when digital immigrants are confronted with a potential violation in a 
salient moral module they would like to prevent it; enjoyment is supposed to suffer if the 
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violation cannot be prevented. Thus we expected that enjoyment would be lower for the 
no-intervention group than for the intervention group. As enjoyment was found to vary 
at the national level, this influence was examined in the analysis of H2. Additionally, we 
controlled for the number of violations a participant had willingly committed, along with 
the other control variables of age, gender, experience with virtual environment, presence 
and technophobia.
At the descriptive level, neither nationality nor experimental condition had an effect 
on overall enjoyment, thus rejecting H2 (Table 3). Instead, we see that the number of 
violations willingly committed had a significant influence on enjoyment, contributing 
the second-most explained variance (η2=.057) behind presence (η2=.161). The only 
other significant predictors of enjoyment were increased presence and prior experience 
with computer games, with the full model explaining just over one quarter of variance 
(adjusted R2=.286). Interpreted, this data tells us that it is not so much the number of 
violations that people are confronted with, but the number of violations people willingly 
commit, that affects enjoyment.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to analyze elderly people’s morally driven behavior in virtual 
worlds. It was expected that elderly people, understood as digital immigrants who did 
not grow up with interactive media and who therefore often lack experience with it, 
would rely on their real-life moral orientations to make decisions in virtual worlds. In 
Table 3. ANCOVA − enjoyment by intervention manipulation and nationality
Descriptives Germans US
No intervention M=3.38 (SD=1.2) M=3.67 (SD=.75)
Intervention M=3.61 (SD=.84) M=3.73 (SD=.98)
 df f sig. reg.B η2
Model 11 4.603 <.001 .365
Constant 1 7.977 .002 .083
Age 1 .004 .947 −.001 <.001
Gender 1 .579 .449 −.138 .007
Presence 1 16.942 <.001 .310 .161
Experience computer games 1 4.296 .041 .165 .047
Technophobia: personal failure 1 2.090 .152 −.163 .023
Technophobia: human machine 1 1.358 .256 −.100 .015
Technophobia: convenience 1 .059 .808 −.021 .001
Number of violations 
committed
1 3.479 .023 .201 .057
Nationality 1 .595 .442 −.118 .007
Condition 1 .267 .607 −.083 .003
Nationality × Condition 1 .061 .805 .001
Error 88  
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order to scrutinize different patterns of morality, we examined morality in elderly people 
in different national cultures, Germany and the US. Summing up our findings, three main 
concepts emerge: (a) the usefulness of MFT for intercultural comparisons; (b) the appli-
cation of MFT as an explanatory factor for moral decisions by elderly people in virtual 
worlds; and (c) the effects of real-life moral orientations on enjoyment of these virtual 
worlds.
Regarding (a), we applied MFT to understand and compare moral differences between 
elderly people in Germany and the US. Our findings indicated that German and US par-
ticipants differed significantly in the salience of moral modules. We argue that these 
observed differences provide us with evidence with which to view both as distinct moral-
ity subcultures, a necessary precondition for the primary focus of our paper.
The central perspective of our research from a media scholar standpoint was to (b) 
explore the potential for moral orientation to serve as an explanatory factor for decisions 
in interactive media environments. We hypothesized that – in a way that was comparable 
to migrating to a new country – elderly people would use their already established moral 
orientations to guide their behavior when they were confronted with moral scenarios in 
the new digital culture. In general, our findings confirmed that established, real-world 
moral module salience leads to fewer observed violations in scenarios corresponding to 
those relevant modules. Moreover, while this mechanism remained stable across both 
cultures, we were confronted with findings that we do not yet have an explanation for. 
For instance, German respondents significantly violated more scenarios in our simula-
tion, and a theoretical explanation is still open. Work on the adoption and appropriation 
of technology suggests that research should account for variables such as attitudes 
toward, and previous experiences with, technology (Czaja and Lee, 2007). However, as 
we were only able to control for technophobia and experience with computer games in 
our study, it is possibly that our German and US participants could have differed in other 
related variables.
Finally, based on previous research on morality and entertainment, we expected (c) 
that when elderly people were confronted with moral transgressions in interactive media 
that occurred in salient moral modules which they could not prevent, enjoyment would 
suffer. We could not confirm the prediction that moral transgressions would reduce 
enjoyment, although one striking finding was the effect on enjoyment of the number of 
violations that people had willingly committed. Still, we have to critically discuss the 
implication of this finding. Analyzing this effect more carefully, we should account for 
the fact that we cannot directly make a claim on its causal directions. We proposed that 
the number of violations committed should impact on enjoyment, expecting that more 
violations being confronted should reduce enjoyment. Not only could we not find this 
proposed effect with our stimulus manipulation, but the effect of the number of willingly 
committed violations runs contrary to our assumptions. If we correlate the number of 
violations with enjoyment (r=.189, p=.049, n=110), the correlation is positive, meaning 
that the more violations one chooses to commit, the more enjoyable the game. This rela-
tionship becomes even more accentuated if we control for nationality and condition (r= 
.270, p=.005, n=106). One potential alternative explanation for this finding is the notion 
of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999). Looking into findings of moral disengagement 
in video games (cf. Hartmann and Vorderer, 2010), it has been suggested that in order to 
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maximize enjoyment from morally questionable media content, users actively refrain 
from their real-life moral attitudes. This moral disengagement hypothesis might actually 
explain the small yet significant correlation between observed violations and enjoyment. 
Although our support for H1 seems to run contrary to this, future research should exam-
ine both the potential for moral disengagement strategies to influence observed decision-
making, and the potential mediating effect of enjoyment on this process. At the same 
time, recent theorizing (Raney, 2010) has been critical of moral disengagement, arguing 
instead that audiences develop narrative- or media-specific moral lenses with which to 
process entertainment media in context, separately from the real world. While on the 
surface this argument suggests a similar alternative explanation as provided by the moral 
disengagement hypothesis, we argue that a central tenet of Raney’s notion would be the 
experience necessary to develop the media-specific moral lens. For the elderly partici-
pants in our study, it is unlikely that they were able to develop a lens for video game play 
both in general and within the context of the narrative, which might be expected to be 
vastly different from their own media and narrative experiences. This domain would be 
a worthwhile extension of our research.
As for now, our findings indicate that the relationship between moral module salience 
and moral decisions is perhaps more straightforward than for the effects these decisions 
will have on enjoyment, particularly for an age group thought to rely on their real-life 
moral orientations when immigrating to the new digital world.
Limitations and future research directions
The exploratory nature of our paper points up several limitations in the study. First, we 
note that the scales employed for measuring moral modules suffered from low internal 
consistency scores that were most likely due to the nature of measuring a broad construct 
such as morality with a scale consisting of a limited number of items. Yet the measure 
still has predictive validity and provides for a parsimonious metric for use in assessing 
such a complex construct as individual moral orientations across different cultures.
Second, the stimulus materials were all pre-tested using a college-aged population, so 
we cannot be sure if the elderly population interpreted and responded to these materials 
similarly. In addition, the research material had to be translated from German to English 
and back again. Even if this was accounted for by multiple retranslations performed and 
checked using a bilingual research team with native German and English speakers, there 
still might be problems with the stimulus materials, particularly as the development of 
morally charged material is not without challenge. Using more scenarios of the same 
module could improve this situation, as it would allow us to test the stability of the 
expected manipulation.
As a third limitation, many studies in the field of interactive media have focused on 
adolescent, student or other younger populations. Because of this, there are few guide-
lines for doing such research with elderly people. Methodologically, we might assume 
that elderly people had more problems when taking part in our study than younger 
people. Elderly users tend to require more support when using the interactive stimulus 
material. This population is also often sensitive to the nature of the research in general. 
In our study, some participants raised questions about data privacy and usage that are 
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not often expressed by younger populations. This may have led to feelings of reactance 
when asked to provide personal opinions about the game, an issue we addressed by 
employing trained research assistants who supported our participants when needed. 
We also provided detailed consent and debriefing forms and further worked to foster 
trust between the research team and our participants by collaborating with adult educa-
tion course managers, both in the US and Germany, who acted as intermediaries.
As a fourth limitation, we are missing the comparison with younger people. We 
assumed that elderly people, due to their experience in life and lack of experience with 
interactive media, would more strongly rely on real-life moral orientation compared to 
young people. For a follow-up study, this comparison should be the focus of interest. 
This limitation is particularly relevant as elderly people are usually not the typical user 
segment of interactive media. However, we might argue that moral concerns with respect 
to interactive media such as video games might be one reason why more mature audi-
ences refrain from using such entertainment (Schmierbach et al., 2011). As we are inter-
ested in analyzing the mechanism between real-world moral orientation and behavior in 
digital media, it is logical to focus on a group of people that has established real-world 
beliefs but lack experience in digital media.
A final limitation concerns the selection of countries for our study. We wonder whether 
choosing cultures with stronger distinctions might have led to stronger differences in the 
salience of moral modules. For example, it seems plausible that moral reactions to the 
in-group/loyalty scenario would be stronger in a more collectivistic culture such as China 
or Japan. However, we note that the mechanisms by which a real-world moral orientation 
impacts on decisions in virtual worlds should be the same for all cultures.
Conclusion
Our study was focused at examining the influence of moral foundations on decisions in 
virtual worlds, specifically with an elderly population of users considered to be digital 
immigrants who can be expected to rely on their ‘real-world’ sense of morality when 
entering novel, virtual space. We assessed moral foundations using MFQ, finding that 
elderly people from two different national cultures (the US and Germany) differed sig-
nificantly in their moral orientations. More central to the current study, moral salience 
was found to be significantly associated with decision-making, with increased moral 
salience inhibiting decisions to violate salient aspects of morality for both populations. 
Effects on enjoyment were less clear, but trended in the direction that committing moral 
transgressions was associated with slightly higher levels of enjoyment.
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